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23 October 1961

Copy No. 155

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

Dominican Republic: The antigovernment rioting that began on 16 October in the capital and spread to several other Dominican cities has increased pressure in the armed forces for wholesale action against the opposition. In the early stages of the rioting, police showed unaccustomed restraint, but there has since been some bloodshed. The fact that gangs of thugs identified with the previous regime have participated in action against the rioters brings another potentially explosive element to the situation. According to the American consul general, the rioters are mostly revolutionary-minded youths acting without centralized direction. Leaders of the university students' federation as well as of the major opposition groups are taking no public part in the disorders, and the consul general sees no evidence that they are clandestinely supporting the rioters.

In this disturbed climate, the government plans to take its long-deferred action against the pro-Castro Popular Democratic Movement by deporting key members of the group. If this action is intentionally or unintentionally extended to other elements of the opposition, it could seriously exacerbate the situation.

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Congo: UN headquarters in New York has instructed its representatives in the Congo to ratify the cease-fire protocol which was worked out last week in UN-Katanga negotiations, according to Under Secretary Bunche. However, the UN has stipulated that the agreement be construed as having no implications

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beyond the immediate military situation in Katanga. UN acceptance is also contingent on an understanding that the protocol must not contravene UN resolutions and must not affect the territorial limits of the Congo as previously understood by the UN. The latter stipulation apparently is an effort to dispel any impression that the cease-fire is a de facto recognition of Katanga's independence. Bunche made no mention of the UN's policy should central government forces invade Katanga, a sore point in the negotiations last week.

Bunche said that Adoula had accepted the protocol on these terms. The Katangans, however, who have been using the cease-fire negotiations to further their pretensions to independence and who remain confident of their military superiority, are unlikely to agree to these restrictions.

According to Bunche, Tshombé's emissaries to Leopoldville have reiterated earlier Katangan demands for political autonomy within a Congolese economic and customs union. Bunche expressed the hope that this was a "bargaining position" and would be received as such by the Adoula government. Congolese officials in Leopoldville, however, have no confidence in Tshombé's good faith and are unlikely to enter negotiations with him on such unfavorable terms.

France-Algeria: French security forces are being reinforced in both Paris and Algeria in anticipation of new violence. The provisional Algerian government (PAG) appears to be maintaining 1 November as its target date for an all-out effort to demonstrate its influence over the Moslem population,

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Meanwhile, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there are indications that resumption of official negotiations may soon be announced. Although the PAG may feel that successful mass demonstrations will strengthen its negotiating position, the negotiations can hardly proceed smoothly if large-scale clashes develop between Moslems and Europeans or if the security forces intervene in strength. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Ruanda-Urundi: A new flare-up of tribal violence on 21 October in the Ruanda area of the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda-Urundi has increased the danger of the "generalized anarchy" envisioned recently by the Belgian political affairs officer in Usumbura. He believes that in such a situation, the 2,500 Belgian security forces in the trust territory would be unable to maintain control because of their small numbers, the difficult terrain, and communications problems. In Urundi, the extremist leader elected to replace the moderate premier assassinated earlier this month may embark on a hostile policy toward Belgium and Ruanda. OK

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[REDACTED] (Backup, Page 3)

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DAILY BRIEF

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DAILY BRIEF

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France-Algeria

PAG preparations for 1 November--the anniversary of the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954--appear to be well along. According to Moslem sources of the American Consulate in Algiers, word is being spread for the Moslems to gather in three predominantly Moslem quarters in the city, locations which will make it easier for the rebel leaders to control the demonstrations and display their influence over the Moslem population. Although the PAG maintains that the demonstrations are intended to be peaceful, European extremists probably hope to provoke clashes in the belief that large-scale fighting now would impede new attempts to negotiate a settlement.

This week's mass Moslem demonstrations in France aroused indignation, shock, and fear throughout the metropole. The American Embassy in Paris estimates that these events will make more remote the possibility of achieving De Gaulle's aim of creating an independent Algerian state willing to cooperate with France and to guarantee minority rights. Moreover, by hastening the growth of anti-Algerian prejudice among metropolitan Frenchmen, the Parisian disorders will make it easier for the OAS to find additional support in the army, especially among the draftees.

Speaking about the possibility of renewing formal negotiations on 18 October, a French representative at the UN indicated that PAG demands for sovereignty over the Sahara were still causing difficulties. He said the PAG is asking Paris to make a statement in effect saying the French "were sorry they had ever mentioned the Sahara and would not raise the problem again." In a public statement on 20 October, Premier Debré announced that France would be prepared to yield the Sahara and its oil to an independent Algeria under certain conditions.

The Algiers apartment of an American oil geologist was bombed on 20 October, presumably by OAS terrorists. Press reports that

the recent US-PAG conversations in Tunis dealt extensively with the question of foreign petroleum interests in the Sahara have aroused suspicion among French rightists that American oil interests were making a deal with the PAG. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Situation in Ruanda-Urundi

The coming to power of a tribal extremist in Urundi and the outbreak of tribal violence in Ruanda suggest that Ruanda-Urundi will become a growing problem for both Belgium and the United Nations. The new Urundi premier, Tutsi extremist André Muhirwa, is likely to eliminate non-Tutsi representation from his cabinet and to pursue a tough policy toward the Hutu peasant majority of Urundi's population and the Hutu government of neighboring Ruanda. Furthermore, Muhirwa, who has been in contact with General Lundula and radical forces in the Stanleyville area of the Congo, will probably favor the pan-Africanism and anticolonialism of the radical African states.


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The new violence in Ruanda apparently is mainly instigated by Hutu leaders who desire to drive as many Tutsis as possible from Ruanda. Some Tutsi extremist bands are countering with their own violence, hoping to get UN invalidation of Ruanda's 25 September election. Even before the present violence, close to 10,000 Tutsi tribesmen had taken refuge in Uganda--recently some 500 refugees daily were counted by British officials--and many others sought safety in Urundi or in religious missions. Violence has been occurring in Ruanda for several months, and the area has been unstable since early 1960 when the ruling Tutsis were overthrown by a Belgian-supported Hutu revolt.

Ruanda-Urundi's problems are due for consideration in November by the General Assembly. Although there has been discussion of independence for the territory next April, there is growing agitation in UN circles for a longer period of trusteeship to prepare the area for independence. The Haitian chairman of the UN commission which visited Ruanda-Urundi last September believes that independence should be delayed some five or six years, during which time Belgium, while remaining behind the scenes, would turn over political responsibility to the Africans


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


but would control economic and social services. He said that it was a poor country with no promising resources except coffee, and added that he "had never encountered so many backward people." 

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